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[Crim. No. 10818. In Bank. Nov. 27, 1968.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD 
WAYNE WHITE, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] 
[2] 
Witnesses-Self -crimination-Defendants in Criminal Pro-
ceedings-Identification of Accused.-In a flrst degree murder 
prosecution, a sheriff's officer's testimony that at the sheriff's 
station defendant consented to try on a coat found nt the 
scene of the homicide and that the coat appeared to fit him 
was properly admitted; the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, with its attendant requirements of the warnings pre-
scribed by Miranda docs not apply to the furnishing of that 
kind of physical evidence. 
Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-"Critical 
Stage" of Prpceeding.-Defendant's trying on of a coat found 
at the scene' of a homicide at the suggestion of a slleriff's 
officer at the sheriff's station was not a "critical stage" of 
the proceedings when absence of counsel could derogate from 
the fairness of defendant's ensuing first degree murder trial. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 179; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 367 
et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 349 et seq. 
14cK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 23; [2,9] Criminal Law, 
§l07(1); [3] Homicide, § 145(3); [4] Criminal Law, § 524(5); [5] 
Criminal Law, § 107(12); [6] Criminal Law, § 325; [7] Criminal 
Law, § 443(3); [8] Criminal Law, § 448(4); [10] Criminal Law, 
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[3] Bomicide-Evidence-Sufficiency of Evidence of First Degree 
Murder.-In a prosecution for first degree murder committed 
in the perpetration of burglary, robbery and rape, the evi-
dence was sufficient to support the jury's detennination of 
first degree lIlurder where defendant's coat was found on a 
chair in a bar, the scene of the homicide; where a .22 caliber 
shell casing was found on the floor of the bar, and the fatal 
bullet was fired from a .22 pistol, admittedly belonging to 
defendant; where, although the victim's genital area was not 
injured, a test for sperm was inconclusive because she was 
menstruating; and where evidence showed a significant cor-
respondence between the amount of money defendant had in 
his possession and the amount taken from the bar. 
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Photographs--To Prove Position 
and Condition of Body.-In a first degree murder prosecution, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a 
photograph of the deceased in evidence, where the photograph 
was a black-and-white depiction of the victim as she was 
found, on the morning after the shooting, in a bar which the 
victim, a waitress at the bar, had the responsibility of closing 
the night before. , 
[6] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Adequacy of De-
fense.-In a first degree llIurder prosecution, defend lint was 
not denied a fair trial because two attorneys represented the 
People in the courtroom while defendant was represented by 
only one deputy public defender, where the initial decision 011 
the number of attorneys assigned to the defense was properly 
the public defender's, where had the deputy defender felt 
inadequate to try the case he could have requested additional 
assistance from the public defender's office or explained his 
difficulties to the trial judge and asked for appointment of an 
associate, where nothing in the record indicated that the task 
of defendant's lawyer was in any way increased by the pres-
ence of more than one prosecuting attorney, and where the 
court could not assure "equal" representation on both sides 
by requiring numerical equality of counsel. 
[6] ld.-Course and Conduct of Trial-Power and Conduct of 
Judge.-In a first degree llIurder prosecution, the trial judge's 
participation in the proeeedings was even-handed, and the 
issue of guilt was tried fairl~' and properly, where the judge 
was alert to protect defendant's rights, and on occasion cau-
tioned the prosecution and interjected questions to insure that 
proper foundation was established for proffered evidence, and 
[4] Admissibility of photograph of corpse in prosecution for 
homicide or civil action for causing death, note, 73 A.L.R.2d 769. 
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where both instances of asserted tnisconduct were outside the 
presence of the jury, in one of which, after the judge had 
sustained a defense objection to evidence offered by the prose-
cution, he pointed out in what form the offered proof could 
be admissible, and in the other of which defendant's CODl-
plaint went to a matter that resulted in a ruling favorable 
to him. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Competency-Declarations and Admissions of 
Defendant.-Statements obtained by interrogation practices 
which are likely to exert such pressure on an individual as to 
disable him from making a free and rational choice are inad-
missible in 11 criminal prosecution. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Officers-Rules for 
Determining Investigatory Conduct.-In a criminal case, the 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming froDl custodial interrogation of defend-
ant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incriminatiom!; 
"custodial interrogation" is questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way. 
[9] Id.-lUghts of Accused-Aid of Counsel-When Right At-
taches.-The "custodial" element of the accusatory stage when 
the right to counsel attaches does not depend on ; the interro-
gator's subjective intent; custody occurs if the suspect is 
physically deprived of his freedoDl of action in any significant 
way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so 
deprived. 
[10] Id.-Determination of Punishment-Admissibility of Evi-
dence.-At the penalty stage of a first degree murder trial, the 
prosecution did not sustain its 'burdcn of showing that defend-
ant's admission was not the product of custodial interrogation, 
and his statement to a detective that' "I killed that broad" 
should not have been received in evidence, where defendant 
introduced evidence of his previous good reputation, beha-
yior and record, and the People emphasized his callousness anll 
lack of remorse in connection with a slaying as warranting the 
death penalty; where, although no objective indicia of re-
straint or compulsion accompanied a sheriff's officer's request 
that defendant go to the sheriff's station to make a statement 
in connection with a homicide investigation, at the station 
the officer learned of evidence against defendant ,focusing 
suspicion on him; where the officer's first question elicited 
defendant's damaging denial that a coat found at the homicide 
scene was his, an apparent falsehood indicating that defend-
ant felt something more than silence was expected and that 











754 PEOPLE V. WHITE [69 C.2d 
rational response; and where the next words of the officer were 
understood by defendant in context as an accusatory state-
ment that produced his admission of homicide. 
[11] ld.-Determination of Punishment-Argument During Pen-
alty Phase.-At the penalty phase of a first degree murder 
trial, the People's closing argument erroneously invited the 
jury to speculate, from properly admissible evidence that 
defendant attempted to escape from custody on the day of his 
arraignment, as to the possibility that in the future prison 
officials might be ineffective in the discharge of their duties 
and permit defendant to escape, where the jury were thereby 
diverted from their duty and responsibility of selecting the 
penalty. 
[12] ld.-Determination of Punishment-Argument During Pen-
alty Phase.-At the penalty phase of a first degree murder 
trial, the selection of the penalty is for the jury alone, and 
defendant is entitled to have them deliberate with that respon-
.sibility in mind; and the prosecuting attorney improperly 
derogated their responsibility both as individual jurors and 
collectively as a jury where, after correctly stating that the 
court would inform the jurors that selection of penalty was a 
matter of their independent individual determination and that 
then the 12 jurors were to arrive at whatever penalty they 
felt appropriate, he argued that "It is not the 12 of you alone. 
It is everyone who has had connection with the case that will 
have the consequences of the imposition of the maximum 
penalty." 
[13] ld.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Procedure for Determining 
Penalty.-Under the rule that any substantial error occurring 
.luring the penalty phase of a murder trial that results in the 
death penalty must be deemed to have been prejudicial since 
it reasonably may have swayed a juror, admission of defend-
ant's illegally obtained statement, and error in tile prosecu-
tion's argument as to penalty, were prejudicial since the choice 
of the penalty rested in the absolute discretion of the jury 
and if only one of the 12 jurors was swayed by the inadmis-
sihle eYidellce or error, then, in the absence of that evidence 
or error, the death penalty might not have been imposed, and 
what might have affected one juror might not have affected 
others. 
APPEAl., automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
!';ubd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of l~os 
Angeles County. Mark Brandler, Judge. Reversed. 
[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminul Law, § 278 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, 
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Prosecution for first degree murder. Judgment imposing 
the death penalty reversed and cause remanded for retrial on 
the issue of penalty only. 
Charles M. Berg, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
and Luther Barrow for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas Kerrigan, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty of the 
first d<'gree murder of Anne Ransom and fixed the penalty at 
death. 'rhe court denied motions for a new trial and for 
reduction of the penalty to life imprisonment. This appeal is 
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
The prosecution presented the case to the jury on the 
theory that the killing was murder of the first degree com-
mitted in the perpetration of burglary, robbery, and rape. 
Mrs. Ransom was a waitress at the Big Time Bar in La 
Puente. About 11 p.m. on April 20, 1966, the bar manager, 
Mrs. McAndrew, left Mrs. Ransom in charge with the respon-
sibility of closing the bar at 2 a.m. When Mrs. McAndrew 
returned to the bar at 7 :45 the next morning she found Mrs. 
Ransom, with a bloody wound in her head, lying naked on IlPr 
.back on a pool table. The victim did not move or li>peak. Mrs. 
McAndrew summoned sheriff's officers. Mrs. Ransom was 
taken to a hospital, where she died on April 22. The cause of 
death was a .22 caliber bullet that entered the middle of the 
forehead and lodged at the back of the brain. On the right 
side of her head was a very recent skull fracture that could 
have resulted from a fall. Her genital area was not injured. A 
teli>t for sperm was inconclusive because she was menstruat-
ing. 
On the morning of April 21, articles of Mrs. Ransom's 
clothing lay on the barroom fioor, a chair, and a table. A 
man's coat was on a chair. In the coat were a label with the 
name of a shop in Lafayette, Louisiana, and a tag with the 
name "White." A .22 caliber shell casing was on the fioor. 
Only 15 or 20 pennies were in the bar till. Mrs. Ransom 'Ii> 
cash record showed that when she closed the bar she had $50 
in currency and $15.50 in coins. 
At 10 a.m. on April 21, Detective Sergeant Nichols and two 
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756 PEOPLE tI. WHITE [69 C.2d 
Palms Apartments, three blocks from the Big Time Bar, and 
talked with Dennis Seiler, a regular customer of the bar. 
Seiler told the officers that he and defendant had been the last 
customers to leave the bar the night before and that when 
Mrs. Ransom. closed the door bellind them at 2 a.m., defendant 
went toward the parking lot and Seiler walked home. Seiler 
agreed to come to the sheriff's station and give a statement 
and the officers left his apartment. . 
Defendant also lived at the Royal Palms. After interview-
ing Seiler, Sergeant Nichols and Sergeant Rowley went to 
defendant's apartment. At that time these officers did not 
know that Mrs. Ransom's wound was caused by a bullet or 
that a .22 caliber shell casing bad been found in the bar or 
that the man's coat found there contained labels with defend-
ant's last name and the name I.Jafayette, Louisiana, a town 
that defendant had left four or five weeks before. The only 
information Nichols had about defendant was that given by 
Seiler. 
Sergeant Nichols knocked on the door of defendant's apart-
ment and it swung open. Nichols called, "Sheriff's Office, is 
anyone homeT" Defendant answered, "Just a minute," and 
came to. the door in his bare feet and without a shirt. Nichols 
displayed Ilis badge and said, "We're Sheriff's officers," and 
defendant said, "Come on in." As Nichols walked through 
the living room he saw a .22 caliber Beretta pistol in a holster. 
He picked up the pistol and asked defendant if it was his. 
Defendant replied that it was.1 He was asked if he objected to 
the officers' looking around the apartment and said, "No, go 
ahead." 
Nichols asked defendant what he had done the night before. 
Defendant said he was "partying." Nichols asked if he had 
been at the Big Time Bar, and defendant said he had not. 
When asked what clothes he wore the night before, defendant 
pointed out a suit and shirt on hangers, still clean. freshly 
pressed, and apparently not worn. Nichols asked defendant 
where he had been drinking, and defendant said that on 
second thought he believed he llad stopped at the Big Time 
Ba.r before going home. NiellOls said the. police "were trying 
to determine wllat had happened the night before, we were 
taking statements from everybody concerned," and asked 
defendant if he would come to the sheriff's station and give a 
statement. Defendant agreed and began dressing. Nichols 
lLater tests showed that the fatal bullet was fired from defendant'. ' 
pistol. . I 
i 
- -I 
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-----------------
asked defendant where he slept, and defendant pointed to one 
of twin beds. Nichols lifted the mattrt'ss and found a sock 
with coins tied in it. Defendant said that the s:Jck was his,2 
t hat he saved change, and tllat it contained about $15. As 
defendant picked up his wallet Nichols saw tlwl it contained 
a number of bills and asked how much money was in it. 
Defendant said approximately $40. 
At the station Sergeant Nichols left defendant in the squad 
room while he talked with other officers for three or four 
minutes. Nichols learned from his fellow officers that about 
$50 in bills and $15.50 in coins had been taken from the bar 
!lnd that the coat found there had the name "White" and a 
Lafayette label in it. By this time Nichols knew that defend-
ant was from Lafayette. He took the coat into the squad room 
and asked defendant to try it on. Defendant did so, and. it 
appeared to fit him. 
Subsequently developed evidence showed a significant cor-
respondence between the amount of money defendant had and 
the amount taken from the bar. The sock eontained $16.67 in 
coins (including only two pennies) and defendant had $87 in 
currency (including about 25 one dollar bills) in his wallet 
when he was booked. On the afternoon of April 20 he had 
cashed his pay check of $44.10. From 5 p.m. until about 1 a.m. 
he and Grant Dickson were in various bars drinking beer and 
"looking for girls." About 1 a.m. defendant drove Dickson 
home and then went to the Big Time Bar. 
About 2 a.m. on April 21 a deputy &heriff on routine patrol 
saw defendant outside the bar. Defendant said he was waiting 
for a girl to close the bar. 
Defendant's roommate visited defendant in jail about three 
weeks after the killing. Defendant then said, "1 did it, but 1 
don't know why .... [1] didn't need the money or any-
thing. " 
Defendant did not testify to the jury. Outside their pres-
ence he testified that he had not consented to the officers' 
entry and search of his apartment on the morning of April 21. 
The trial judge properly found on the basis of Sergeant 
Nichols' contrary testimony that defendant freely consented 
to the entry and search. (See People v. McLean, 56 Ca1.2d 
660, 664 [16 Cal.Rptr. 347, 365 P.2d 403] j People v. Burke, 47 
Cal.2d 45, 49 [301 P.2d 241].) 
21n tact the sock was one of a pair that defendant '8 roommat'l had 









1· ~ : 
~ ; ! 
;H 
>I' 



























758 PEOPJ,E v. WHITE [69 C.2d 
[1] Sprgeallt Nichols' testimony that at the sheriff's sta-
tion defendant consented to tryon the coat found in the bar 
and that the coat appeared to fit him was properly admitted. 
The privilege against self-incrimination, with itf> attendant 
requirement of the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726-727, 86 S:Ct. 
1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], does not apply to the furnishing of 
that kind of physical evidence. (See United Stales v: Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 222 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1154-1155; 87 S.Ct. 1926] ; 
People v. Sudduth, 65 Ca1.2d 543, 546 [55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 
P.2d 401] ; People v. Ellis, 65 Ca1.2d 529, 534-535 [55 Cal. 
Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393]; People v. Graves, 64 Ca1.2d 208, 210 
[49 Cal.Rptr. 386, 411 P.2d 114].) [2] The trying on of 
the coat was not a "critical stage" of the proceeding when 
absence of counsel could derogate from the fairness of the 
ensuing trial. (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 [18 
L.Ed.2d 1178, 1183, 87 S.Ct. 1951] ; cf. United States v Wade, 
supra, 388 U.S. 218, 227 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1157-1158].) 
[3] Defendant contends that the evidence shows neither 
burglary, robbery, nor rape or attempted rape and therefore is 
insufficient to establish first degree murder. He emphasizes the 
lack of testimony as to how he effected entrance to the bar 
after Mr$. Ransom had closed it, as to whether he accomp-
lished sexual penetration of the victim, and as to whetller any 
specific monies found in his possession were coins or bills from 
the bar. His argument in this regard virtuaJ1y ignores the 
evidence snmmarized above. That evidence is sufficient to sup-
port the jury's determination. 
[4] It is asserted that the admission in evidence of a 
photograph of deceased was pre·judicial error. The photograph 
is a black-and-white depiction of the victim as Mrs. McAn-
drew found her on the morning of April 21. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by receiving it in evidence. (Peo-
ple v. Mathis, 63 Ca].2d 416,423 [46 Ca1.Rptr. 785, 406 P.2d 
65] ; People v. Ha"rison, 59 Ca1.2d 622,627 [30 Cal.Rptr. 841, 
381 P.2d 665] ; People v. Darling, 58 Ca1.2d 15, 21 [22 Cal. 
Rptr. 484, 372 P.2d 316].) 
[5] Defendant contends that lIe was denied a fair trial 
because two attorneys represented the People in the courtroom 
whi1e defendant was represented by only olle deputy public 
defender. Defendant cites no authority for this contention. He 
states that ill court.s martial under the lTniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice established practice requires that counsel for the 






Nov. 19GB] PEOPLE v. WHITE 
(69 C.2d 751; 72 Cal.Rptr. 873. 446 P.2d 993J 
759 
rank. He asks this court to enunciate a similar rule of practice 
for criminal trials. The initial decision on the number of 
attorneys assigned to defendant's defense was properly that 
of the public defender. Had the deputy who represented 
defendant felt inadequate to try the case because he was fac-
ing two attorneys or for any other reason, he could have 
requested additional assistance from the office of the public 
defender or could have explained his difficulties to the trial 
judge and asked for the appointment of an associate. Nothing 
in this record indicates that the task of defendant's lawyer 
was in any way increased because of the presence of more 
than one prosecuting attorney. In any case, lawyers differ 
enormously from one another in their professional skills and 
modus operandi. The court could not assure "equal" repre-
sentation on both sides of a case by requiring numerical 
equality of counsel. [6] It is further contended that the 
trial judge abused his discretion by guiding and counselling 
the two prosecuting attorneys througllOut the trial. The judge, 
however, was alert to protect the riglJts of defendant. On 
occasion he cautioned the prosecution and interjected ques-
tions of his own to insure that proper foundation was estab-
lished for proffered evidence. The two instances of asserted 
misconduct particularly referred to by defendant were outside 
the presence of the jury. In one instance after the judge had 
sustained a defense objection to evidence offered by the pros-
cution, he pointed out in what form the offered proof could be 
admissible. The other instance occurred during the trial of the 
issue of guilt when the prosecution offered in evidence incrim-
inating admissions made by defendant at the sheriff's station 
after he tried on the coat. Defendant objected that receipt of 
this evidence would violate Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 
U.S. 436, 467 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 719-720], because the admis-
sions were made during custodial interrogation without the 
required warnings as to his constitutional rights. After col-
loquy as to the legality of the offered evidence the judge 
stated that unless the prosecution considered it vital to its 
case" I can't understand or appreciate the logic or wisdom of 
possibly asking that error be committed." The prosecution 
then withdrew its offer of proof. Thus defendant's present 
complaint goes to a matter that resulted in a ruling favorable 
to him. 
The judge's participation in the proceedings was even-
handed. The issue of guilt was tried fairly and properly. 
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offer of evidence of defendant's admissions, and the judge 
overruled defendant's renewed objection. Sergeant Nichols 
testified that on April 21 at the sheriff's station he showed 
defendant the coat that was found in the bar and "I asked 
him if it was his coat. He replied, 'No.' I asked him if he 
would mind trying the coat on. He said, 'All right.' He stood 
up. I handed him the coat, he put it on. He then took the coat 
off and gave it back to me. I told him that the coat appeared 
to fit him and, besides that, that I believed his last name was 
written inside the coat. He hesitated for a while. He stated, 
'It's my coat.' He said, 'I know I'm in trouble. I killed that 
broad.' "8 
[7] Statements obtained by " interrogation practices 
which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as 
to disable him from making a free and rational choice" are 
inadmissible. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 464-
465 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 717-718].) [8] Thus "the prosecution 
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant 
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effec-
tive to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By cus-
todial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." (384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 
706].) [9] The "custodial" element of the accusatory 
stage when the right to counsel attaches does not depend on 
the interrogator's subjective intent; "custody occurs if the 
suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, 
that he is so deprived." (People v. A,.nold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 448 
3In the proceedings outside the jury's presence that resulted in the 
judge's decision t.o admit these incriminating statements, Sergeant 
Nichols testified that when defendant made the admissions Nichols at 
once told him to be quiet, that it was the officer's duty to advise him of 
his constitutional rights, and thn t he wns under arrest for suspicion of 
robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. Officers then warned 
clefendant that he had the right to counsel and to remain silent and that 
his statements could be used ngainst him. 'fhese warnings met the require· 
ments of Prople v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Ca1.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361]. 
Two months later Miranda v. An'zona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 473 rlG 
L.Ed.2d 694, 723], decided that a )l<'TNOIl heM for int.errogation must also 
be told that. it he is indigent a lawyer will be nppoillt('d to represent him. 
Because defenonnt was not. so ndvised the People at the trial (fo\1l' 
months after the Miranda decision) did lIot seek to use statements and 
real evidence obtained from him by sheriff's officers after they told him 
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[58 Cal.Rptr. 115,426 P.2d 515] ; People v. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 
232,246 [57 Cal.Rptr. 363,424 P.2d 947].) 
[10] No objective indicia of restraint or compulsion 
accompanied Sergeant Nichols' request that defendant go to 
the sheriff's station to make a statement. The ofticer .. told 
him that we had talked to several people that were down 
there, we were trying to determine what had happened the 
night before, we were taking statements from everybody con-
cerned, and would he give us a statement. He stated that he 
would." At the station, however, the sergeant learned of evi-
dence against defendant that, taken with what he had diseo\'-
ered at defendant's apartment, focused suspicion on defend-
ant. 'l'he sergeant obviously and properly had no intention 01' 
permitting defendant to leave without explaining that evi-
dence. He testified that his purpose when he confronted 
defendant with the coat was to give him an opportunity to 
make a "reasonable explanation," not to elicit a confession. 
His first question, however, elicited the damaging denial that 
the coat was defendant's. This denial was not a reasonable 
explanation; it was an apparent falsehood clearly indicating 
that defendant felt that something more than silence was 
expected of him and that the pressures of the situation had 
disabled him from making a rational response. The next words 
of the sergeant-"that the coat appeared to fit him and ... 
I believed his name was written inside "-could be alld were 
. understood by defendant in context as an accusatory state-
ment that produced an admission of homicide. The prosecu-
tion did not sustain its burden of showing that the admission 
was not the product of custodial interrogation (People v. 
Kelley, supra, 66 Ca1.2d 232, 246; People v. Arnold, supra, 66 
Ca1.2d 438, 448) and the statements should not have been 
received in evidence. 
At the penalty stage of the trial defendant introduced tes-
timony of family and associates as to his previous good repu-
tation, behavior, and record. The People emphasized his ap-
parent callousness and lack of remorse in connection with 
Mrs. Ransom's slaying as warranting the death penalty. It 
was to this stated end that the prosecution used defendallt's 
unlawfully obtained admission that" I know I'm in trouble. I 
killed that broad." [11] Also to this end and to show 
that the prospect of defendant's rehabilitation was not good, 
the People introduced evidence that defendant attempted to 
escape from custody on the day of his arl'aignnwlIt by 
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evidence was properly received, but the People's closing argu-
ment erroneously invited the jury to speculate from that evi-
dence as to the pussibility that in the future prison officials 
lllight be ineffeetive in the discharge of their duties and per-
lllit defendant to escape:' Thus the jury were diverted from 
their duty and responsibility of selecting the penalty in viola-
tion of the principle underlying our holding in People v. 
Morse, 60 Ca1.2d 631, 643 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 
A.L.R.3d 810]. (In re Pike, 66 Ca1.2d 170, 172-173 [57 Cal. 
Rptr.172,424 P.2d 724].) 
[12] The prosecuting attorney in arguing as to selection 
of penalty correctly stated that "The Court is going to 
infonn you that this is a matter of your independent indi-
vidual determination. And then the 12 of you arrive at what-
ever penalty you feel appropriate." Then, however, he pro-
ceeded improperly to derogate their responsibility both as 
individual jurors and collectively as a jury by arguing, "It is 
not the 12 of you alone. It is everyone who has had connection 
with the case;that will have the consequences of the imposition 
of the max~um penalty."5 Of course the death sentence is 
imposed by 1jhe judge and carried out by the administrative 
official charged with that duty, but the selection of the pen-
alty is for the jury alone and the defendant is entitled to have 
them deliberate with that responsibility in mind. 
I 
I 
4Tbe proseeuting attorney argued, "if you think that Mr. White is 
remorsefUl-why, sure he is, folks, that is why he tried to escape from 
t.be County Jail and get out of this state. That is why. He has demon-
strated that he will take the first oJlportunity that is available to him and \' 
IIC will try to get out of custody. He will not take his medie-ine. He will 
lIOt take punishment. He will do anything he can to avoid it. . 
"And, ladies and gentlemen, what would he be like after an escape' 
More destitute, more desperate than he was at these times." 
Defense counsel promptly objeeted and the trial judge admonished the 
jury to disregard the last comment. 
u'l'bc illeollsistent argument as to tlds matter ill its entirety was, "The 
Court is going to inform you that tbis is a matter of your independent, 
individual determination. And then the 12 of you arrive at whatever 
penalty you feel appropriate. 
"And AS you do that, you must never think in terms of, 'I, Juror 
No. ii, or Juror No.6, 7, 8,' whatever the number might be, 'am the one 
who is doing this, who is imposing the maximum punishment.' 
"You are, in effect, an adjunct of the administration of justice of the 
State of California. It is not the 12 of you alone. It is everyone who has 
had connection with the ease t.llat will have the consequences of the 
imposition of the maximum penalty, not just the 12 of you. 
"So, as you reflect upon your individual l'ole in t.his, one of you must 
not think that, 'I am doing this all by royself. I am considering all of 
the evidenee, all tbe law applicable, and I am deciding whether the crime 
is so grave, so monstrous, so serious, 80 lacking in mitigation, that I 
feel that this punisllment is appropriate.' I would suggest that is not 
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[13] The People contend that if there was error in the 
admission of defendant's illegally obtained statement there 
was no prejudice in light of the other evidence of defpIHlallt's 
want of remorse, and that any error in the proseeution's 
argument as to penalty is not prejudicial in light of the 
court's correct instructions. The choice of penalty, however, 
rests in the absolute discretion of the jury and" If only one 
of the twelve jurors was swayed by the inadmissible evidence 
or error, then, in the absence of that evidence or error, the 
death penalty would not have been imposed. What may affect 
one juror might not affect another. The facts that the evidence 
of guilt is overwhelming, as here, or that the crime involved 
was, as here, particularly revolting, are not controlling. 'I'his 
being so it necessarily follows that any substantial error 
occurring during the penalty phase of the trial, that results in 
the death penalty, since it reasonably may have swayed a 
juror, must be deemed to have been prejudicial." (People v. 
Hamilton, 60 Cal.2d 105,137 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4,383 P.2d 412].) 
The judgment imposing the death penalty is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded for retrial on the'issue of penalty only 
and for the pronouncement of a new sentence and judgment 
as provided by law. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissentfrom reversal of the penalty. 
TIle majority apply impractically rigid evidentiary stan-
dards to a proceeding designed not to ascertain guilt, but to 
assess penalty. In so doing, they overlook the basic purpose of 
the penalty proceeding, which is to receive evidl'nce "of the 
circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's 
background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or 
mitigation of the penalty." (Pen. Code, § 190.1.) 
I am well aware of the rule that "any substantial error 
occurring during the penalty phase of the trial, that results ill 
the death penalty, since it reasonably may have swayed a 
juror, must be deemed to have been prejudicial." (Italics 
added.) (People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 105, 137 [32 
Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412].) 
In the context in which defendant's statement was used, 
tllere is certainly no substantial error, and I doubt that there 
is any error whatever. When defendant was asked to tryon a 
coat-a procedure the majority finds unobjectionable-he 
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interrogation voluntarily added, ,. I know I'm in trouble. 1 
killed that broad." Sergl'llllt Nichols imll1ediatt·\y cautioned 
defendant in a manner the majority finds satisfied the 
requirements of People v. DOI'ado (H)65) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 
Ca1.Rptr.169,.398 P.2d 361]. 
'fhe unsolicited statement of defendant was clearly admis-
sible. As this court said, unanimously, in People v. Cotter 
(1965) 63 CaI.2d 386, 396 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862] : 
"Neither this court, nor the United States Supreme Court, 
has ever taken the position that the desire of a guilty man to 
confess his crime should be stifled, impeded, discouraged, or 
hindered in any way." 
Assuming arguendo that the statement was inadmissible, it 
strains credulity to find prejudicial error in its use in the 
penalty phase of the trial. Defendant said "1'm in trouble.' I 
This conceded nothing 110t then evident. "I killed that 
broad. I I This was introduced after the jury had already 
found he llad in fllct kiHr.d the waitl'(>ss. It added no new 
element. Only applying the term "broad" to the victim 
migllt be deemed questionable. Yet that eipression is not con-
sidered to be criminal argot; it is common language of the 
street, not pejorative but merely inoffensive slang. (See H. L. 
Mencken~ The American Language, 4th ed. (1938) p. 577.1 ) 
If that is the manner in which defendant spoke, or r~gularly 
speaks, then that is the way in which the jury must accept 
him and his utterances in weighing "aggravation or mitiga-
tion" of the totality of circumstances. In t11e truth-seeking 
process there is no justification to conceal that knowledge, 
whether significant or trivial, from the jury. 
Whether the statement in question reflects callousness or 
laek of remorse is subject to interpretation. But it is not 
inadmissible, for the jury is entitled to consider defendant's 
subjective response to the brutal act he committed. Toward 
that end, the defense produced a witness whom defendant told 
"he was sorry he did it." The jurors Who have the grave 
responsibility of assessing penalty may weigh all of the 
defendant's virtues and vices. Remorse, being the echo of a 
lost virtue, is one of the elements properly considered. 
I find no reversible error in the prosecuting attclTlwy'lI 
argument to the jury. Defendant's attempt to escape from the 
IMencken places broad for woman in the same category as law for 
policeman, big-house for prison, croaker for doctor, bone-orcllard for 








county jail was his voluntary act. From that established cir-
cumstance flows a perfectly rational deduction that defendant 
was, and in the future might be, a difficult rather than con-
trite prisoner. 
The prosecutor's discussion regarding individual responsi-
bility of the jurors may have been "inconsistent" as the 
majority's footnote 5 suggests. There is a giant stf.'P between 
inconsistency-which ordinarily redolwds to the advantage of 
the defense-and prejudicial error. Any confusion rf.'garding 
the function of the jurors, individually and collectively, was 
adequately dissolved by the court in its instructions. It is 
evident that the jurors were not confused and that they fol-
lowed the court's instructions, for after returning their ver-
dict they were polled and each juror responded individuany 
that the verdict was his. . . 
I would affinn the judgment in its entirety. 
McComb, J., and Burke, J.,concurred. 
